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The alliance project delivery method is used for approximately one third of all Australian 
government infrastructure projects representing $8-$10 billion per annum. Despite its widespread use, 
little is known about the differences between estimated project cost and actual cost over the project 
lifecycle. This paper presents the findings of research into 14 Australian government alliance case 
studies investigating the observed cost uplift over each project’s lifecycle. I find that significant cost 
uplift is likely and that this uplift is greater than that afflicting traditional delivery methods. 
Furthermore, most of the cost uplift occurs at a different place in the project lifecycle, namely between 
Business Case and Contractual Commitment. 
 
Because Australian governments have finite resources, they employ formal capital rationing 
methods in prioritising funds between competing investment proposals presented by the various 
government agencies (Department of Treasury and Finance, Victoria 2010).  The decision to support 
or not support a particular investment proposal is based on a balanced judgment of the costs and risks 
against the service benefits to the community that is documented in an investment proposal. These 
investment proposals are analysed, quantified and articulated in Business Cases which outline the 
merits of the investment proposal, along with a thorough analysis of estimated capital costs, 
operational costs, risks and benefits. 
The absence of a robust and comprehensive Business Case is, therefore, problematic for 
Government since it may lead to misallocation of its limited funds.  In particular, where investment 
proposals involve major physical infrastructure, the existence of significant cost uplift (i.e. where the 
actual cost exceeds the Business Case estimate of project cost) raises serious doubts about the basis of 
the original investment decision.  Put more simply, a significant under-estimation of the project cost 
could mean that an alternative project or service should have been commissioned or that the project 
itself should never have been built. 
Government procurement of physical infrastructure in Australia has largely been based on the 
principle of transparency.  Consequently, most infrastructure projects have been delivered using 
traditional competitive bidding processes. As the Australian construction industry has evolved, 
however, so too have delivery methods. Early traditional methods such as Design-Bid-Build (DBB), as 
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well as Design and Build (DB), are now supplemented by Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) and more 
recently Alliancing (Department of Treasury and Finance, Victoria 2009). 
These traditional delivery methods involved price competition between constructors based on 
documented technical drawings and specifications, commercial conditions of contract and structured 
payment systems. A common characteristic of traditional methods is that project delivery risks are, to 
varying degrees, allocated to the constructor.  
The resulting formal contractual arrangements sometimes created an unproductive positional 
relationship between the ‘buyer’ and the ‘seller’, leading to adversarial relationships and litigious 
outcomes. To overcome these litigious outcomes, the US Army Corps of Engineers examined 
alternative delivery methods to reduce litigation and disputes. They were interested in developing a 
delivery method that could save time and money, provide flexibility of response to disputes and 
protect the relationship between the ‘buyer’ and ‘seller’ (US Army Corps of Engineers 1991).  
Further work (with the assistance of the private sector) led to the first partnering model. 
Partnering was promoted as disputes-prevention (as opposed to disputes-resolution) and aimed to 
improve communication, increase quality and efficiency, achieve on-time performance, improve long-
term relationships and enable a fair profit and prompt payment for the contractor. It was neither a 
contractual agreement, nor legally enforceable (US Army Corps of Engineers 1991). The alliance 
delivery model is an extension to partnering and was first used in the oil and gas fields of the North 
Sea by British Petroleum (BP) in the early 1990s (Department of Treasury and Finance, Victoria 
2009). 
Australia embarked upon its first project using the alliance delivery method in 1994 being the 
Wandoo Alliance in Western Australia (Department of Treasury and Finance, Victoria 2009). Since 
then, the use of alliancing has enjoyed significant growth and it has emerged as a mainstream delivery 
method in Australia (see Figure 1 below - Department of Treasury and Finance, Victoria 2009).  
Alliancing’s core features include; a collective assumption of risk by Owners, Contractors and 
Designers rather than the allocation of risk associated with traditional delivery methods (DBB, DB and 
PPP), a legal agreement between the parties that reflects “no blame; no suit” and joint management of 
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the project (by the Owner and Contractor) with unanimous decision making directed to achieving the 
common goal of “best for project” (Department of Treasury & Finance, Victoria 2009).  The collective 
assumption of the risk is “... fundamental to understanding the alliance culture” and refers to the 
aspiration that all parties assume (and manage) project delivery risks rather than assigning to any one 
party (Department of Treasury and Finance, Victoria 2009). 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
In the period 2004-2009 the total value of government alliance projects in Australia was $32 
billion, representing approximately one third of all public sector infrastructure projects (Department of 
Treasury and Finance, Victoria 2009).  Despite this rapid rise in an innovative delivery method, there 
is a notable dearth of research into the pricing outcomes and negotiation behaviours involved in 
alliancing. The objective of this paper is to address this gap in our knowledge.  
This lack of empirical evidence about large infrastructure delivery is not new. In 2003 
Flyvbjerg, Skamris Holm and Buhl noted that “despite the ..... enormous sums of money being spent 
on infrastructure, surprisingly little systematic knowledge exists about the costs, benefits and risks 
involved”.  Flyvbjerg et al examined cost uplift in 258 infrastructure projects across the USA and 
Europe ranging in value from $1.5 million to $8.5 billion; all of which were completed between 1927 
and 1998.  They found that “underestimation of costs at the time of decision to build is the rule rather 
than the exception” and that the average cost uplift was 28% for all project types (road, rail, 
tunnel/bridges).  They also found that lengthy and protracted implementation phases translated into 
risks of substantial cost uplift as did project size and ownership (Flyvbjerg et al 2004). 
Other researchers have found a similar pattern of cost uplift.  Odeck (2004) investigated cost 
uplift for Norwegian road projects in the period 1992-1995 and reported a mean overrun of 7.9% 
(ranging from -59% to +183%) with cost overruns being more prevalent on smaller projects.  Contrary 
to Flyvbjerg et al, he found no influence of project type (road, rail etc) on the cost overrun. 
Ibbs, Kwak, Ng and Odabasi (2003) took another perspective on cost uplift by comparing the 
average amount of uplift for DBB against DB. Their particular interest was the impact of change on 
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project productivity (i.e. cost uplift) and the merits of one delivery method compared to another.  The 
methodology involved self assessment by the Project Manager on 67 projects across the USA ranging 
in size from $5 million to $1 billion.  They found that cost uplift was approximately 13-15% but with 
little difference between DB and DBB. 
In the Australian context, Duffield, Raisbeck and Xu (2008) benchmarked Australian PPP 
projects against traditional (DBB and DB) projects and, from a sample of 67 projects (including 63 
infrastructure projects), found that the cost uplift from budget approval to completion was 86% for 
PPPs and 20% for DBB/DBs.  Duffield et al also compared their findings to various other researchers 
including the Treasury Taskforce (2000), National Audit Office (2003), Mott MacDonald (2002) and 
Allen Consulting (2007) which to varying degrees and using different methodologies examined cost 
uplift and traditional (DBB, DB and PPP) delivery methods.  A consistent finding amongst these 
researchers being that significant cost uplift occurred for all traditional methods.  
In the international context, Hodge and Greve, (2007) reviewed the performance of PPP projects 
and their public policy implications.  They found that “... a range of ... successes and failures can be 
seen around the globe....” and that there was “... insufficient research to be fully informed on outcomes 
(of PPPs) to date”. 
While there is some modest research on the question of cost uplift, the causes are not well 
understood. Despite criticisms of a biased methodology that was said to favour PPPs (Unison 2005), 
Mott MacDonald (2002) concluded that there is a systematic tendency for project appraisers to be 
overly optimistic. On the strength of this report, the British Treasury recommended that explicit 
adjustments be made to estimates of project’s costs to account for this “Optimism Bias” (HM Treasury 
2003).  Similarly, the British Department for Transport has published a guidance document (prepared 
by Flyvbjerg) on the uplift to be applied to capital cost estimates for transport projects at the time of 
Business Case preparation (British Department of Transport 2004). 
A problem common to all of the above researchers was lack of access to suitable objective data 
and defining a common starting point for the commencement of cost uplift. For instance, Flyvbjerg et 
al (2004) noted that “... in most cases it is virtually impossible to identify the .... real decision date” 
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and associated cost estimate.  Caution therefore needs to be exercised on comparing cost uplift 
between different researchers. Table 1 summarises the research into cost uplift. 
Insert table 1 about here 
Little has changed since Flyvbjerg et al (2003) commented on our lack of knowledge of cost 
uplift. There has been little reported research into the issue, although the research that has been 
undertaken is largely consistent in finding that significant cost uplift occurs between the Business Case 
estimate (sometimes described as the ‘Decision to Build” (Creedy 2006)) and project completion. 
Most researchers have focussed their attention on the correlation between quantum of cost uplift and 
project type (road, rail etc) with little research on possible correlation between cost uplift and the 
delivery method. Only Flyvbjerg has systematically addressed cost uplift causation, as distinct from 
correlation. There is no reported research on cost uplift – either quantum or causation - when the 
alliance delivery method is used. 
This is a potentially serious shortcoming for decision makers given that, as noted earlier, cost 
uplift is significant in the original investment decision and that one third of all Australian Government 
infrastructure projects used the alliance delivery method. Therefore, my research questions are: 
RQ1: Is cost uplift likely in publicly funded alliance projects in Australia?  
RQ2: If there is cost uplift in alliances, is it greater than that observed in other delivery 
methods (DB, DBB and PPP) and, if so, when? 
METHODOLOGY 
The research questions involve both specific (i.e. is there cost uplift?) and broad (i.e. when does 
it occur) components. Therefore I chose a method that provided detailed or “thick” data (Yin 2004). I 
chose to undertake a mixed method confidential case study approach using both qualitative and 
quantitative data because (1) the confidential case study method enables in-depth exploration of the 
data, incorporating specific context and environmental facts that cannot be adequately addressed in a 
purely quantitative study (Yin 2004), (2) a mixed method study could “provide more rounded 
evidence in support of its conclusions and recommendations” (Bourn 2007) and (3) a mixed method 
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provided for the triangulation of evidence from “people as well as documentary sources” (Bourn 
2007). 
I selected fourteen cases for in-depth analysis. This allowed me to incorporate a full range of 
evidence types including documents, archival records, interviews and observations. This enabled the 
consideration of a broad range of historical, attitudinal and observational issues and also allowed for 
the inclusion of context and was suited to our research questions. Ethical clearance from University of 
Melbourne was obtained that involved de-identifying the participants and projects was obtained. In 
some instances this meant some identifying detail was  removed from the data presented in this article. 
In summary, the case study analysis allowed me to (1) explore and understand key factors and 
contextual influences on any cost uplift in individual alliances, (2) explore, understand and identify 
areas of possible difference between traditional (DBB, DB and PPP) projects and alliances in so far as 
they may impact cost uplift and (3) explore and understand where cost uplift was experienced by 
individual project. The methodology is summarised in Figure 2.  
Insert figure 2 about here 
Phase 1: Purposive Sampling 
The sampling frame for the project was based on a list of all known current and past Australian 
alliance projects provided by the Alliancing Association of Australasia (AAA). Since I was interested 
in large publicly funded infrastructure projects, I assessed this list against three key criteria, namely 
that the project was a government alliance project; that it was procured within the last five years; and 
that it was valued over $100 million.  
Seventy-one alliance projects were within the research parameters. All Alliance Leadership 
Team members of these projects were approached by a combination of email and telephone to take 
part in an internet based survey that posed questions on alliance agreement format, perceived alliance 
performance, Target Outturn Cost comparison, project duration, activities undertaken prior to selecting 
an alliance, successful outcome indicators, the possibility of using alternative delivery methods; and 
the use of cost criteria in the evaluation. Participants were also asked about the name and composition 
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of alliance members.  In line with other surveys within the infrastructure industry I used a five-point 
Likert scale (Sclove 2001) to rate these attributes.  
Respondents were grouped into two categories, Owners and Non-Owner Participants (NOPs), 
with NOPs comprising constructors and designers. Eighty-two responses were received from 46 
alliances, with 35 Owner responses and 47 NOP responses (of which 25 were constructors and 22 
were designers). This response rate equated to 64% of the 71 alliances. Responses were received from 
projects located in Victoria (18%), New South Wales (24%), Queensland (45%), and Western 
Australia (13%).  
Phase 2: Case Study Analysis 
Since I was interested in studying a broad range of alliance projects, I decided to use maximum 
variation purposive sampling. This involved selecting cases base on performance (good versus poor), 
sector (road, rail, water), NOP selection processes (non-price and price), location (state) and 
complexity (program versus project alliances). Since the study focused on cost uplift, I only included 
projects that were completed or well progressed.  A summary of the cases is provided in Table 2.  
Insert Table 2 about here 
The case studies were conducted through a mixture of face to face interviews with key alliance 
Owner and Non-owner personnel, and a detailed review of associated project documentation. 
Consistency was achieved throughout the interviews by maintaining, to the maximum extent 
practicable, the same interview leader and the use of a structured set of interview topics. Given the 
scale of the research, a number of investigators conducted interviews. Some of these research team 
members had participated in varying roles in some of the alliances studied (advisor to the Owner, the 
NOPs or the alliance). To increase the integrity of the research, internal processes were implemented 
to ensure there were several peer reviews of all findings.  
Each stage of the project lifecycle was analysed to determine actual performance and compared, 
where possible, to the Business Case and the Target Outturn Cost (TOC). The Research Team noted 
that some of these alliances were part of a broader project undertaken by the same Owner and after 
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review it was determined that they were sufficiently independent (different objectives, different scope 
of work, different NOPs, different commercial frameworks, different selection processes etc.) that they 
could be considered as individual case studies for the purpose of this research. 
RESULTS 
The following sections detail the results of the analysis into cost uplift. Specifically, the key 
findings are interspersed with the limited existing literature so as to provide a holistic framework for 
understanding cost uplift in Australian public infrastructure alliances that builds on current knowledge. 
This aligns well with the qualitative methodology outlined (Eisenhardt, 1989; Suddaby, 2006) and 
follows the series of research questions.  
Owners used non-price processes to select their alliance partners (with subsequent negotiation 
of TOC) in 40 of the 46 (85%) alliances for which responses were received in the purposive sampling 
undertaken in Phase 1.  This non-price selection and negotiation process was similar for all of these 40 
alliances and involved the following essential sequential steps which are also shown diagrammatically 
on Figure 3: 
Step 1. The estimate of the project cost is prepared as part of the Business Case; 
Step 2. The Business Case (BC) is approved by the government (generally Treasury and a 
sponsoring government department); 
Step 3. The preferred alliance non-owner participants (NOPs) are selected using non-price criteria 
(typically this decision is based on corporate and individual capability and experience); 
Step 4. The Target Outturn Cost (TOC) is negotiated by the government with the NOPs; the TOC 
represents the best estimate of the outturn project cost and is used as the basis from which any cost 
savings or overruns are ultimately shared between the Owner (government) and partners in the 
alliance (NOPs). 
Step 5. If the Owner (government) requests any changes of scope (additions or deletions to the 
project) the negotiated TOC is adjusted accordingly and becomes the Final TOC; 
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Step 6. This Final TOC is compared to the Actual Outturn Cost at completion (AOC) and any cost 
underrun or cost overrun is shared between Owner (government) and the other alliance partners 
(NOPs). 
Insert figure 3 about here 
As Figure 3 illustrates, Alliances differ from more traditional delivery methods (DB, DBB and 
PPP) in three major ways. First, in alliances, the asset owners (government) select the Designer and 
Contractor (the alliance partners or NOPs) using non-price selection rather than a competition with 
tendered price as the dominant selection criteria. Second, owners negotiate the outturn price (TOC) 
with the designer and contractor (NOPs) rather than accepting a competitively tendered project price. 
Finally, Contractual Commitment (CC) between the Owner and NOPs occurs after price (TOC) 
negotiation rather than after accepting a competitively tendered outturn price. 
To allow for a comparison between alliances and different project delivery types, Figure 3 
shows the commonly used milestones in the literature for the project lifecycle. ‘Decision to build’ in a 
traditional project equates to Business Case in an alliance, ‘Contractual Commitment’ in a traditional 
project equates to agreeing the TOC or accepting a competitively tendered price and ‘actual costs on 
project completion’ in a traditional project equates to Actual Outturn Cost (AOC). 
Cost Uplift under the Alliance Delivery Method 
Observed cost uplift in the 14 alliance case studies plotted against the project lifecycle is shown 
in Figure 4. In fact, all cases experienced cost uplift. The 50% cost uplift at project completion shown 
on this figure represents the arithmetic mean of the 14 case studies with 10 of the 14 case studies 
between 25% and 95% uplift and none negative. Thus, the first research question is answered in the 
affirmative: cost overruns are likely under the alliancing delivery method. 
Insert Figure 4 about here 
To better understand the nature of cost uplift, the evolving cost estimates were analysed over the 
lifecycle of the alliance project. 
Business Case to Contractual Commitment 
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During this stage of the project lifecycle, the Business Case has been approved, the owner 
(government) has selected preferred alliance partners and negotiated a TOC. The parties contractually 
commit to this TOC via an alliance legal agreement (Contractual Commitment). As Figure 4 indicates, 
the majority of the cost uplift occurs in this stage. The arithmetic mean of the cost uplift of the 14 case 
studies in this stage was 40% (of a total uplift of 50%) and 10 of the 14 case studies experienced an 
uplift of between 25% and 100% in this stage. There was no decrease from the Business Case estimate 
for any case studied. 
Contractual Commitment to Final Target Outturn Cost 
After the initial TOC is negotiated at Contractual Commitment it is (generally) only subject to 
adjustment if the owner (i.e. government) changes the physical scope of the project. The final TOC 
represents the net sum of any such adjustments and is the basis against which the Actual Outturn Cost 
(AOC) is compared to calculate the share of the savings or overrun between the owner (government) 
and alliance partners.  
The arithmetic mean of the cost uplift for the 14 case studies in this stage was 10% (of the total 
50%) with 9 out of the 14 case studies reporting uplifts of between 0% and 25%. 
Final TOC to Actual Outturn Costs (AOC) 
There were no observable under/overruns between the Final TOC and the Actual Outturn Cost 
(AOC). The arithmetic mean of the cost uplift for the 14 case studies in this stage was 0% (nil) with 12 
out of the 14 case studies between -3% and +2%. 
Alliance Cost Uplift Compared with Alternative Delivery Methods (DB, DBB and PPP) 
Given the substantially higher cost uplifts evident in the preceding analysis, the next step was to 
compare the timing of cost uplifts across delivery methods. The results are presented in Figure 5.  
Flyvbjerg et al (2003) observed project uplift findings are presented as points on the far right of the 
diagram as he does not provide details of where the uplift occurs during the project lifecycle. 
Insert Figure 5 about here 
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The evidence suggests that greater cost uplift in alliances is more likely to occur earlier in the 
project lifecycle compared with traditional cost uplifts (DBB, DBB and PPPs). This varies 
significantly from the assumption of linearity of increasing costs across the project lifecycle that 
informs the procedures of the British Department for Transport (2004).  In fact, there is a decreasing 
or log function shape to the relationship indicating different causal factors of cost overruns. Thus, the 
findings also clearly answer the second part of the research question in the affirmative: Alliances are 
likely to suffer greater cost uplift than other delivery methods (DB, DBB and PPPs). 
CONCLUSION 
Within the limitations of this research, the findings suggest that alliance projects experience a 
cost uplift of approximately 50% from Business Case to Project Completion. The direction of this 
uplift is similar to that found by previous researchers but is significantly higher for alliances than that 
reported for traditional delivery models (DB, DBB and PPP). 
This research has also found that most (40% of the 50%) of the uplift occurs between Business 
Case (the Decision to Build) and negotiating the Target Outturn Cost (Contractual Commitment). This 
finding stands in contrast to the (limited) existing research which has found that for traditional projects 
most cost uplift occurs between Contractual Commitment and Project Completion. These findings 
raise several potential topics for future research; what are the causal factors behind the cost uplift 
observed in alliances and what are appropriate mitigation strategies. 
The causes of cost uplift in infrastructure projects are not well understood. For traditional 
projects these causes are believed to be Optimism Bias and Strategic Misrepresentation. (Mott 
MacDonald 2002, Flyvbjerg et al 2006). It is not known if these same causal factors also afflict 
alliances but the findings suggest additional causal factor(s) are at play which may explain the 
differences to traditional projects in terms of both the additional cost uplift and the earlier stage in the 
project lifecycle at which the cost uplift occurs.  
There are three reported and relevant mitigation strategies for dealing with cost uplift in 
infrastructure projects; explicit upward adjustment to the Business Case estimate (British Department 
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of Transport 2004), formal benchmarking of individual corporate performance (Siemiatckyl 2007) and 
the creation of an institutional culture that rewards accurate cost estimates (Flyvbjerg et al 2007, 
British Department of Transport 2004). These strategies are complementary and each seeks to address 
the two known causal factors of Optimism Bias and Strategic Misrepresentation. However, if, as is 
suggested above, additional causal factors afflict alliances, these current mitigation strategies are likely 
to be of limited use in addressing the serious problems of cost uplift when the alliance delivery method 
is used. 
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Figure 1: Use Of Alliancing Delivery Method For Infrastructure In Australia 1996-2009 
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Figure 4: Observed Cost Uplift Over The 14 Alliance Delivery Cases 
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Figure 5: Comparison Of Cost Uplift In 14 Alliance Cases Compared With Reported Cost 
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Key Findings Comments 
1 Flyvbjerg  et al 2002 
Flyvbjerg et al (2003) 
Flyvbjerg et al (2004) 
British Dept of Transport (2004) 
Flyvbjerg et al (2006) 
DBB, DB 
 
 Significant cost uplift correlated with project type 
(road, rail, fixed link) 
 Various articles using general common data 
source (Flyvbjerg 2003) and partial use of Mott 
MacDonald (2002). 
 No comments on movement of uplift over the 
project lifecycle 
 
2 Mott MacDonald (2002) DBB, DB and PPPs  Significant cost uplift correlated with project type   Incorporated into Department of Transport 
Guidelines. 
 Methodology criticised by Unison (2005). 
 Mott MacDonald uses the term Optimum Bias as 
a description of the uplift not a causal factor per 
se. 
3 Duffield (2008) DBB, DB and PPPs  Significant cost uplift but different between 
DB/DBB and PPPs 
 Addresses movement over the project lifecycle. 
 
4 Allen (2007) DBB, DB and PPPs  Significant cost uplift but different between 
DB/DBB and PPPs 
 
5 UK Treasury Taskforce (2000) PPPs  Addressed relative savings to other delivery 
methods not cost uplift per se 
 Did not track uplift over the project lifecycle. 
6  National Audit Office (2003) DBB, DB and PPPs  Addressed relative savings to other delivery 
methods not cost uplift per se 
 Refer Unison critique of methodology. 
 Did not track uplift over the project lifecycle. 
7 Creedy (2006) DBB, DB  No significant correlation between delivery 
method and uplift. 
 Inverse correlation of project size and uplift. 
 PhD thesis.  Cost uplift on major Highway 
projects in Queensland, Australia 





Key Findings Comments 
 Significant uplift in 1 in 10 projects 
8 Odeck (2004) DBB, DB   Significant uplift observed. 
 Inverse correlation with project size. 
 No correlation with project type (road, rail) 
 Norwegian road projects (1992) 
9 Ibbs et al (2003) DBB, DB  Cost uplift 13-15% (CC – Final) but little 
difference between DB and DBB) 
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Table 2: Summary of Case Study Selection 
Case Study 
Criteria 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
Type Water Road Road Road Road Rail Rail Rail Water Water Water Water Water Road 
Size >$100m >$100m >$100m >$100m >$100m >$100m >$100m >$100m >$100m >$100m >$100m >$100m >$100m >$100m 
Geographic 
Location 
Victoria Victoria Qld WA WA Qld Qld Qld Qld Qld Qld Qld Qld NSW 
Selection 
Process 

















































Negotiated Negotiated Tendered Negotiated Tendered Negotiated Negotiated Negotiated Negotiated Negotiated Negotiated Negotiated Negotiated Negotiated 
Notes: 
1. Performance was defined relative to the expectations at Contractual Commitment.  Hence ‘poor’ cost performance was where Actual Outturn Costs 
(AOC) exceeded the Final Target Outturn Cost (i.e. the initial TOC adjusted for variations) by more than 10%.  Similarly ‘poor’ time performance 
reflected an actual project duration that was more than 10% larger than budget time. 
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